Well OK, that is one option - a strategic decision to split from the US and commit fully to the EU instead. I doubt if there's enough political support for that course of action at the moment though.
It's true that history is written mainly by historians, and that historians have to earn a living just like the rest of us. So what's your point? Those who refuse to learn from history are doomed to repeat it - somebody said.
'Traditional' Wars are fought over resources, currency protection etc. Real 'War' is fought through the financial sector.
Sure the New World Order is a 1 army world, the only way we will have peace on Earth, its true, its all true, apparently.
My point was in answer to your point. As far as I could tell (and in case you have forgotten it), you seemed to be suggesting that history will provide the answer to the question, "What kind of leader was Blair?". I answered this with a suggestion that history is not necessarily, or in every case, the best judge of this sort of question. Are the other points you have made that I can remind you of what you said? I am always happy to help.
I applaud this analysis, very solid. However, as is obvious by now, I don't agree with the view that the result of the British counter-attack was in the balance. Nothing is certain in war but I believe Thatcher would have assessed the (small) risk of an unfavourable outcome as entirely acceptable. There's a phrase in regular use nowadays which describes the British need to re-take the Falklands: "Too big to fail." The importance of this endeavour to the UK and US governments was such that, by hook or by crook, it was going to be successful. I am confident that we have no real idea of what was happening behind the scenes, nor will we any time soon.
The risk of an unfavourable outcome was enormous given it was entirely possible with devastating consequences. Plus you can only defend things that are too big to fail if you have the resources to do so, and the the British were 'all in'. The Americans were keen to be seen as impartial and only gave support, latest model sidewinders and intelligence, in the background. So what practical form do you think 'by hook or by crook' would have taken ?
What form? Literally anything that the Americans could have done and plausibly denied doing. Provision of men, materials, expertise. Perhaps an American vessel or plane which was observing from a distance could have been "shot down by the Argentinians", thus causing the US Atlantic Fleet to become involved, "protecting US personnel, property and interests". If I could think of a foolproof plan for manipulating armed conflicts around the globe, I wouldn't be riding an eleven-year-old Ducati and posting my ideas in a forum.
I haven't read the whole thread yet, but has it yet been suggested that intelligence sources that feed the PM's office may have played a role? There are plenty of unelected people in positions of power and all the PM does is review the advice he is given and make an executive decision. If someone beneath him wanted him to think a certain way he could have been supplied with endless sheets of posh a4 paper that said what ever they needed to say to reach the desired outcome.
Unless of course Blair said "Find or make up something so I can go to war with Bush" which is what my money is on.
Is he not obliged to do some form of due dilligence on the information supplied to him ? "I acted on the best advice" doesn't absolve him of responsibility. The Iraqis in exile certainly had their own agenda but Blair looked for and found what he wanted to find, the buck should have stopped with him, only it didn't.
I doubt Blair looked for or found anything. His due diligence is asking M16 what the answer is. He obviously can't check their work. In this case, I am willing to bet anything you like that the Yanks fed M16 intelligence - the dodgy dossier essentially. This would have been cooked up by the Pentagon security service - the one Cheney and Rumsfeld set up when the CIA studiously seemed incapable of providing the intelligence that they wanted to hear. For this they relied on Iraqi sources who have since been totally discredited. It is true that the world of spies is awash with liars, fantasists, double agents and people with undeclared agendas. So if you want to believe something, you'll definitely be able to find someone who will tell you it. Because they tell you what you want to hear, you invest them with a credibility that they probably don't have. Chalabi was one such person. MI6 would have told Blair that they had this intelligence from the US. They may have said they didn't think it was very credible, but Blair would have pushed back on them. At the end of the day, who did he want to believe? So much simpler for the Special Relationship to believe the Yanks, unaware maybe, that it was all manipulation anyway.
Yes, if the Argentinian navy had put to sea those outcomes would have been much more likely. That is why sinking Belgrano was such a crucial move - it ensured that the Argentinian navy remained safely in port. The task force would not have needed to lose many more ships than it did to have been unsuccessful - the strike that sank Atlantic Conveyor may have been a lucky shot, but it had a very damaging effect on the British offensive. The loss of one carrier would have meant that the air defences would be greatly overstretched; the loss of one landing ship would have slowed the offensive significantly. The majority of the Argentine Air Force pilots were not only highly skilled, but also very brave - given more time and less opposition they would have caused significant damage to both land and sea forces. If the action had dragged on any longer than it did then the southern winter would have set in, the conflict would have become a stalemate and the Argentinians would probably have won the ensuing war of attrition - their supply routes were a fraction of what ours were.
Glid - Blair knew, beyond any doubt, that the reasons for going to war were completely bogus. 45 minutes to prepare an attack on European targets ? Anyone with half a brain could see that was utter rubbish... He lied to parliament, he knew he was lying...
Why was it that the Argentinians did not put more forces forward in order to repulse the British counter-attack? Why was the bulk of their Navy held back? Why wasn't there an escalation of the war? Most of the reasoning in your post is solid but you aren't asking the important question, "Why did the Falklands War happen the way it did?". These are not insignificant questions. That fact that Galtieri withheld his main forces (other than an ill-advised propaganda exercise involving the General Belgrano, which back-fired badly on him) tells me that there was more than a simple war strategy at work. There are reasons why Galtieri held back and you can bet your house on the likelihood that Thatcher knew them.
With an occupying force of 3 companies of special forces, two companies of cavalry, one regiment of grenadiers, three anti-aircraft defence groups, seven combat support companies, two infantry battalions and three additional infantry regiments, two artillery groups, two logistics battalions, two combat engineering companies, two communications companies, and a mechanised infantry brigade - what did Galtieri hold back exactly ? That's rather a lot of troops to occupy a group of islands with a population of 1800 people...
I know the reason why the Conflict happened the way it did - it was started by the Junta to distract attention from the anti-government riots in Argentina. Their (flawed) intelligence was based on the position of successive British governments (largely the previous, appeasing, labour government). The reason the Argentine navy did not put to sea was because they knew that RN hunter-killer submarines would wipe them out. The Argentinians did reinforce their ground troops - but were restricted by the fact that Stanley airport was not large suitable for large troop transport aircraft, and was bombed by the RAF and the RN. They could not use ships to transport troops - as they did for the actual invasion - because of the British submarines.
